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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,
Defendant/Petitioner.

CaseNo.20001049-SC
Priority No. 13

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW
This Court granted Petitioner Lance Michael Weeks' Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,12 P.3d 110. The Court's
Order granting the Petition is attached hereto as Addendum A, and the court of appeals1
decision in Weeks is attached hereto as Addendum B. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The questions presented for review are as follows:
1. Assuming arguendo Weeks filed an untimely request for a restitution hearing in
the trial court, the question is as follows: Once the trial court undertook to conduct a
restitution hearing, was the trial court obligated to provide a meaningful hearing, where
Weeks would be entitled to review, challenge and present evidence relating to the matter?
The court of appeals ruled Weeks was not entitled to such a hearing. State v. Weeks, 2000

UT App 273. The court of appeals' ruling is in conflict with State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 712
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991), and State v.
Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of
review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Leyva. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah
1997) (cite omitted). The court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal in this case for an
abuse of discretion. "An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless
it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion.'" Weeks. 2000 UT App
273, V (citing State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)).
2. Whether the court of appeals properly construed Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(e)
(Supp. 1998). In considering application of that provision, the court of appeals rejected the
plain language ofthe statute and disregarded statutory purpose to find that the statute requires
a defendant to request a restitution hearing at or before sentencing or waive such hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The second question concerns an issue of statutory
construction. This Court will review the decision of the court of appeals "for correctness,
and its conclusions of law are afforded no deference." Esquivel v. Labor Com'n of Utah,
2000 UT 66,^11, 7 P.3d 777.
3. Whether the court of appeals1 ruling - that the trial court was not required to make
certain findings on the record concerning restitution — was in conflict with the plain language
of Section 76-3-201 (4) and (8\ and State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1233-34 (Utah 1997)
2

(the court "shall make" the reasons for restitution "a part of the court record").
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See the standard of review set forth at question 2, above.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Weeks' request for a restitution hearing is preserved in the record as follows: In the
pleadings file for District Court Case No. 99192830 (hereinafter referred to as "Case No.
2830") at 37; in the pleadings file for District Court Case No. 99193049 (hereinafter referred
to as "Case No. 3049") at 41; and in the pleadings file for District Court Case No. 99193239
(hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 3049") at 39. In addition, the matter is preserved in the
record at 60.*
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions will be determinative of the questions presented for review:

1

In the trial court proceedings relating to this matter, Weeks was convicted in seven
separate cases. Three case files comprise the record on appeal here, including the pleadings
file for District Court Case No. 991902830 (hereinafter "Case No. 2830"), the pleadings file
for District Court Case No. 991903049 (hereinafter "Case No. 3049"), and the pleadings file
for District Court Case No. 991903239 (hereinafter "Case No. 3239"). The record also
contains three transcripts designated as 59, 60 and 70. The transcripts relate to all seven
cases.
With respect to the pleadings file for CaseNos. 2830,3049, and 3239, the court clerk
separately numbered the pages in each file beginning with page 1. In that regard, the record
on appeal contains three separate pages identified as page 1. To avoid confusion in referring
to documents in the pleadings files, Weeks will identify the pleadings by referring first to
the trial court case number as indicated above, followed by the page number. For example,
Weeks will refer to page one of the pleadings in the case ending in "2830" as follows: (Case
No. 2830:1). With respect to the transcript pages, Weeks will refer to them in the usual
fashion. For example, the first page of the transcript designated as volume 59 will appear
as follows: (R. 59:1).
3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998).
Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum C hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
In February 1999, the state filed charges against Weeks for several offenses in seven
separate cases. (See Case Nos. 2830:3-4; 3049:3-4; 3239:2-4; see also R. 70:2-3.)
On July 6, 1999, Weeks entered into a guilty plea before the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick in each case. Weeks pleaded guilty to two separate counts of attempted illegal
possession of a controlled substance, class A misdemeanor offenses (Case No. 2830:19-27;
R. 70:3); attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen motor vehicle, a third degree felony offense
(Case No. 3049:24-32); two separate counts of failing to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, third degree felony offenses (Case No. 3239:22-30; R. 70:2); attempted burglary, athird
degree felony offense (R. 70:2); and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony offense (R. 70:3).
On September 10,1999, Judge Frederick entered judgment against Weeks, sentencing
him to a combination of consecutive and concurrent prison terms and ordering him to pay
$9,104.35 in restitution. (See Case Nos. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab
2:9-10; and the "Judgment" from the envelope identified as "Documents From Case No.
991902297.")
4

On September 21,1999, counsel for Weeks requested a restitution hearing in the trial
court. (Case Nos. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39.) On September 30,1999, the court granted
the request and scheduled the hearing for October 18, 1999.

(Case Nos. 2830:37-39;

3049:41-43; 3239:39-41.) Thereafter, on October 18 during the hearing, Weeks requested
an opportunity to review documentation supporting the order of restitution. The judge
n

entertain[ed]n defense counsel's request, reviewed statements in the presentence report, and

ruled that based on the "evidence" and "arguments," restitution was "fair and reasonable."
(R. 60:3-7.) Weeks appealed, seeking due process in the proceedings.
The court of appeals declined to address the issues on appeal on the grounds that
Weeks waived his right to a restitution hearing. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273. This Court
ordered review of the matter. (See Addendum A, attached hereto.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
CASE NO. 2830: According to the charging papers relating to Case No. 2830, on
January 23, 1999, officers stopped a vehicle driven by Weeks for a registration violation.
Officers determined to impound the vehicle for the violation and discovered a "container
with a substance which field tested positive for Methamphetamine." (Case No. 2830:3-4.)
Weeks was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. (Id.) He pleaded
guilty to attempted illegal possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor and
was sentenced to one year imprisonment. (Case No. 2830:33-34.)
CASE NO. 3049: According to the charging papers relating to Case No. 3049, on
December 19, 1998, a vehicle was taken from David Hatton's driveway. The vehicle was
5

unregistered and uninsured. (Case No. 3049:4.) On January 9,1999, officers recovered the
car. "[T]he car's steering column had been broken and a screw-driver was used to start it."
(Case No. 3049:4.) Weeks pleaded guilty to attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen vehicle,
a third degree felony offense (Case No. 3049:24-32), and was sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term not to exceed five years. (Case No. 3049:39-40.)
CASE NO. 3239: According to the charging papers relating to Case No. 3239, on
December 16,1998, Yolanda Garcia drove her car to a store, parked the car and entered the
store. When she returned to the parking lot, she discovered "that her vehicle had been
stolen." (Case No. 3239:3.) Later that evening, an officer identified the car, activated his
lights to pull the car and driver over, and observed the driver accelerate to speeds in excess
of 70 miles per hour through a residential area. The driver also "failed to stop for four
different stop signs and made numerous turns. The driver eventually stopped the vehicle, got
out, and ran away." (Case No. 3239:3.) When the owner retrieved the vehicle, "she located
items that did not belong to her, including a letter" written to Weeks. (Case No. 3239:3.)
Weeks was charged with receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle and failing to
respond to an officer's signal to stop. (Case No. 3239:2-3). The state dismissed the first
charge in exchange for Weeks' guilty plea for failing to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, a third degree felony offense. The trial judge sentenced Weeks to an indeterminate
prison term not to exceed five years. (Case No. 3239:37-38.)
THE RESTITUTION ORDER: On September 10,1999, Judge Frederick sentenced
Weeks in the above-entitled matters and in four additional cases to indeterminate prison
6

terms, and he ordered that the prison terms be served concurrent to each other and
consecutive to other matters before Judge Noel. (See_R 70: Tab 2:9-10.)
Judge Frederick also ordered "that [defendant] pay restitution in the amount of
$9,104.35, [and] that [defendant] pay a recoupment fee [of $250] for the use of [defendant's]
publicly provided lawyer.,M Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, T[3; (R. 70: Tab 2:10). Eleven days
after imposition of restitution, on September 21, 1999, Weeks filed a Motion for Review
Hearing in each case, objected to the restitution amount, and requested a hearing pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(e)(Supp. 1998). (CaseNos. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39.)
Judge Frederick granted the request for a hearing and scheduled the matter for October 18,
1999. (Case Nos. 3049:41-43; 2830:37-39; 3239:39-41.)
At the October 18 hearing, counsel for Weeks argued there was an insufficient
evidentiary basis for restitution. It was not supported by "evidence in terms of damage."
Counsel requested a "factual basis" and support for the award "in terms of [] paperwork"
in order that counsel may assess the accuracy and reliability of the information. (R. 60:4-7.)
A copy of the transcript for the October 18 hearing is attached as Addendum D.
In connection with Weeks1 request, the judge stated that in assessing restitution, he
relied on "the sum of three separate categories identified in the presentence report."
There were victim impact sums in the amount of $1500 each to one, Hatton
and one, Garcia for auto damages as a result of thefts of this defendant, and then the
$6104.35 to Liberty Mutual Insurance carrier, which was the carrier for the Garcia
vehicle for repairs incident to the conduct of this defendant.
Now those three sums totaled the $9100 plus dollars that I ordered in the way
of restitution at the time of the sentencing.
7

(R. 60:4-5; Addendum D hereto.)
Since statements in the presentence investigation report constituted double hearsay,
Weeks' counsel again asked for a factual basis to support restitution, including paperwork.
Counsel argued that the figures in the report were not reliable: "When things are rounded
off[,] amounts of $1500 bring[] some question in my mind just looking at this." (R. 60:5.)
The prosecutor opposed the request for documentation, indicated he believed the
amounts were "probably" appropriate, and argued the award was reasonable. (R. 60:6.)
Counsel for Weeks again objected to the report as insufficient to support the matter:
I don't think [] there's a factual basis today in response to defendant's motion sufficient for your Honor to make the finding (inaudible) restitution figures that are there.
I think the presentence report ought to be helpful, especially to the Court and
counsel as to what it seeks to prove or document evidence that would support the
figure, but I don't think it's sufficient as of today for your Honor to actually enter an
order (inaudible).
(R. 60:6-7; Addendum D hereto.)
Thereafter, the trial judge ruled on the matter, stating the following:
Thank you, Mr. Williams. Given the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the
persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I believe, by [a] preponderance of the
evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the sums sought for restitution are fair and
reasonable. Given what I have reviewed, that being the presentence report, as well
as the orders in the matter, as well as now having heard arguments of counsel, I was
persuaded and now [am] persuaded that [the] preponderance of the evidence burden
has been met, that the numbers I have ordered as restitution [are] fair and reasonable.
Consequently the motion to modify the — I will characterize it as a motion to modify
the order of restitution is denied.
(R. 60:7; Addendum D hereto); Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^5. Judge Frederick then entered
the following order regarding the matter:
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This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objection to the Order
of Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being
present and represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by
its counsel. The Court having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the original order in the Judgment and Commitment in this case is the
proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms that order and denies
defendant's motion.
(Case Nos. 2830:42; 3049:45; 2393:43.) A copy of each order is attached as Addendum E.
Weeks appealed from the final order of restitution.2 He argued that he was denied a
"full hearing" and due process in the proceedings. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 16.
In response to Weeks' arguments, the state argued for the first time on appeal that
Weeks' request for the restitution hearing was untimely and should be deemed waived. A
majority of the court of appeals agreed with the state and refused to reach the merits of
Weeks' claims on appeal. Id. at H 10-12.
Weeks maintains that the court of appeals erred. Inasmuch as the trial court addressed
the merits of Weeks' claims on October 18, the issues were properly preserved. Weeks is
entitled to review of the merits on appeal. He respectfully requests that this Court reverse

2

See Stames, 841 P.2d at 714-15 (defendant appealed from order entered in connection
with restitution hearings); State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343, 15, 992 P.2d 995
(defendant appealed from order entered in connection with restitution hearing);
see also ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4,1110-16, 998 P.2d 254 (notice of appeal
timely filed within 30 days of final determination regarding attorneys' fees); Sittner v.
Schrieven 2000 UT 45,1118-23 ,2 P.3d 442 (judgment was not final until issues regarding
attorneys' fees were finally resolved): see also State v. DepaolL 835 P.2d 162,163-64 (Utah
1992) (considering Oregon law in interpreting Utah restitution statute); State v. Bonner, 771
P.2d 272,273 (Or. 1989) (since restitution is part of the sentence, an order/judgment is not
final for purposes of appeal until restitution issues are resolved); Utah Code Ann. 76-3201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) (restitution is part of sentencing).
9

the court of appeals1 ruling, vacate the trial court's order of restitution, and remand the case
to the trial court for a full hearing on the restitution issues as further set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When a trial judge has considered the merits of an issue and ruled on the matter, the
issue is deemed properly preserved for purposes of appeal. See Johnson. 821 P.2d at 1161;
State v. Beason, 2000 UT App 109, 1flfl4-l5, 2 P.3d 459. In Weeks1 case, the trial judge
considered the merits of Weeks' request for a "full hearing" on restitution, then denied the
request on the basis that the restitution award was fair and reasonable. Weeks appealed. The
court of appeals refused to address the merits of the matter on the basis of waiver.
The court of appeals1 ruling is in error. The court of appeals should have considered
Weeks1 arguments on appeal and found that the trial court failed to ensure due process and
a full hearing on the restitution issues in this case. On that basis, this Court should reverse
the court of appeals1 ruling, vacate the trial court's restitution order, and remand the case for
a full hearing on restitution.
Next, the court of appeals has interpreted Section 76-3-201(4)(e) to provide that if a
defendant fails to object to the imposition of or amount in restitution "at or before
sentencing," he has waived his right to a "full hearing." That interpretation is not in harmony
with the plain language or purpose of the statute. Since the provision at issue serves to
ensure due process in sentencing, Weeks maintains that this Court should construe § 76-3201(4)(e) in a manner consistent with other sentencing provisions. To that end, the

10

timeliness requirement set forth at subsection (4)(e) should be construed to provide that the
trial court is required to provide a full hearing on the issue of restitution without undue delay
where defendant has made a request within a reasonable time. The timeliness requirement
should be construed as directory, not mandatory, to ensure due process.
Finally, the court of appeals erred in ruling that a trial court is not required to identify
on the record the reasons for ordering restitution in light of mandatory statutory factors.
Also, the court of appeals was incorrect in ruling that the trial court in this case complied
with the statute when it ordered restitution. In that regard, this Court should reverse the
court of appeals1 ruling and remand the case to the trial court for compliance with the statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. ASSUMING ARGUENDO WEEKS FAILED TO TIMELY
REQUEST THE RESTITUTION HEARING, ONCE THE TRIAL COURT
UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE THE HEARING. IT WAS OBLIGATED TO
ENSURE DUE PROCESS IN THE PROCEEDINGS.
A. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS AT SENTENCING.
Restitution may be imposed as part of sentencing.
A court may sentence a defendant to a prison term, impose a fine, enter
judgment for a lower category of offense pursuant to § 76-3-402, place him on
probation, disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to § 76-3-201,
sentence the defendant to serve prison terms concurrently or consecutively, order the
defendant to pay restitution, or suspend a prison sentence.
State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241,1244 (Utah 1980). According to Utah law, if restitution is
ordered and

M

the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the

restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the

11

issue." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998).
The court of appeals has interpreted the "full hearing" provision set forth at § 76-3201 (4)(e) to ensure due process, where a defendant is entitled to review and present evidence
relating to restitution and to cross-examine the other side's witnesses. See Stames, 841 P.2d
at 715-16. In considering the provision, the court of appeals has stated the following:
Under both the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due process requires
criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably
reliable information. See State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994). Thus,
" [fundamental principles ofprocedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant
have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual
information upon which his sentence is based." Id. at 855.
Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, ^[8; see also State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah Ct. App.
1997); Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
This Court likewise has recognized that a defendant is entitled to due process in
sentencing. "The due process clause in both the United States and Utah Constitutions
'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.5" State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah
1993) (cites omitted) (double hearsay statements in sentencing report may not serve as a
basis for imposing a sentence against defendant); State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115,118 (Utah
1985) (constitution requires judge to act on reliable, relevant information in sentencing);
Lipsky. 608 P.2d at 1248-49; State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982).
In this matter, the trial judge imposed restitution against Weeks in the amount of
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$9,104.35. Weeks objected to the order and requested afoilhearing on the matter, including
an opportunity to review and cross-examine the evidentiary basis for the award. Weeks
argued that the statements set forth in the presentence investigation report were insufficient
to support the amount and he was entitled to review supporting documentation on the matter.
(CaseNos. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39; R. 60).
The trial court considered Weeks1 arguments then denied his request to review
supporting evidence on the basis that restitution was fair and reasonable. (R. 60:5-7.) Weeks
appealed. He argued the trial court committed error when it refused to allow him to examine
and challenge the accuracy and reliability of evidence relating to the restitution amounts.
See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^6.
The court of appeals refused to consider the merits of Weeks1 claims and found
waiver. Id. at*|H[9-12. The court of appeals1 ruling is in error. See infra Point I.B., below.
Assuming arguendo Weeks made an untimely request for a restitution hearing, the
trial court nevertheless granted the request, then held a hearing where it considered counsels1
arguments before ruling on the merits of the matter. (R. 60.) Since the trial court proceeded
with the matter on the merits, it was improper for the court of appeals to find waiver. See
infra Point I.C., below. The court of appeals should have considered the merits and reversed
the case as a result of the statutory and due process violations.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN THIS MATTER.
FAILED TO PROVIDE DUE PROCESS AND A FULL HEARING.

IT

This case is similar to Starnes, 841 P.2d 712. In that matter, defendant pleaded guilty
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to charges of criminal mischief and assault, and the victim requested restitution. Thereafter,
a restitution hearing was scheduled, which the defendant failed to attend for lack of notice.
Id. at 713. The trial judge entered restitution against defendant in the amount of $281.89.
When Defendant Starnes failed to make restitution payments on the judgment, the trial
judge entered an order to show cause against him and held a hearing.

During that

proceeding, defendant asked the court to set aside the judgment and to provide a foil hearing
on the restitution award. Id In response to defendant's request, the trial court held two
additional hearings (a hearing was held on November 13, 1991 and a hearing was held on
January 8, 1992), where defendant was able to engage in a limited and flustered crossexamination of the victim with respect to the alleged damages suffered, and then to proffer
evidence from his own witnesses. Starnes. 841 P.2d at 713-14. The judge specifically
refused to permit defendant's witnesses to testify. Id. at 714.
After the hearings, the judge increased the amount in restitution to $450. Defendant
appealed and argued "the trial court denied him his statutory right to a foil hearing." Id. at
714. In response, the state claimed defendant waived the issues in the lower court by failing
to "challenge the trial court's erroneous ruling below." Id. at 716. The court of appeals
rejected the state's waiver claim and found the issues preserved for appeal. f"A matter is
sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity
to rule on the issue.1" Id at 716 (citing State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am. 771 P.2d 682,
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
The court of appeals then addressed the matter of the foil hearing and found that the
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trial court violated the statute. Specifically, the court of appeals determined that to constitute
a full hearing, not only was the trial court required to provide defendant with the opportunity
to review and cross-examine the evidence allegedly supporting the amount in damages, but
also, defendant must be able to present his evidence at the hearing. Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715;
see also. State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 339, 340-42 (Utah 1985) (state's evidence failed to
support restitution amount ordered by court). The court stated, "Even when the third and
fourth hearings are combined, however, it is evident that Starnes was not afforded a 'full
hearing.' The trial court refused to 'hear' Starnes's evidence that there was no actual damage.
Therefore, while Starnes was allowed to appear in court, he was denied an opportunity to
present his evidence." Starnes. 841 P.2d at 715. The court of appeals remanded the case for
a proper hearing. Id. at 716.
Pursuant to Starnes, once the trial court in Weeks1 case determined to consider the
merits of Weeks' requests and objections, Weeks was entitled to due process in the matter.
Instead, the trial court proceeded with the matter in violation of the statute and Weeks' due
process rights.
Specifically, in ordering restitution here, the trial court relied only on statements set
forth in the presentence investigation report to assess the amount. (R. 60:4-5.) The report
reflected that David Hatton's car was stolen from his home. It was uninsured. When it was
returned, the radio was damaged and the car was scratched and dented. Also, Hatton was
missing items of personal property that were not described even generally in the report. The
report totaled damages at $1500. It is not clear from the report whether the amount was
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based on an estimate, replacement value, cost of repairs or a haphazard guess.
(See "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 8.)
The report also reflected that Yolanda Garcia's car was stolen. When it was returned,
it required repairs. Garcia claimed to be missing personal items that were not described, but
valued at $500 and she paid $500 on an insurance deductible plus an additional $500 for
repairs. The report stated that Garciafs insurance company paid $6104.35 toward repairs on
the car. (See "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 9.)
During the October 18 hearing, Weeks questioned the reliability of the statements
contained in the report, where the statements apparently came from the report author (C.B.
Stirling), who in turn summarized information either from the victims, an insurance agent,
or other third-party witnesses. (See "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 13.) Weeks
argued the report alone could not serve as the basis for assessing restitution. (R. 60:5-7.)
Indeed, the statements were double-hearsay. With respect to such statements, this
Court has ruled as follows:
For example, the ISAT report, which is itself hearsay, summarizes the
statements made by the niece during the interviews. The report then relates a
summary of the mother's description to the ISAT interviewer of statements made by
the niece. Although hearsay evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding,
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing.
Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071: see also Chambers. 709 P.2d at 340-42 (evidence insufficient to
support restitution amount).
Notwithstanding the unreliability of the report, the trial judge in Weeks' case
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considered it to be sufficient. The trial judge flentertain[ed]fl Weeks1 arguments then denied
his request to review documentation allegedly supporting the amount in restitution. (R. 60:7.)
The trial judge ruled that n[g]iven the circumstances" and the state's burden of proof, and
based on the statements set forth in the "presentence report," and the "arguments of counsel,"
the restitution order was "fair and reasonable." (R. 60:7.)
The trial court's ruling was in error. The trial court was required to ensure due
process. Starnes, 842 P.2d at 715-16; Gomez, 887 P.2d at 854-55; Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071.
Weeks should have been provided with the opportunity to review and cross-examine
evidence relating to the restitution amount. See Starnes, 842 P.2d at 715-16; Johnson, 856
P.2datl071.
Since the trial court failed to provide a full hearing or due process in the matter, its
ruling constituted an abuse of discretion and violated Weeks' constitutional and statutory
rights. See Starnes, 842 P.2d at 715-16: State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989)
(judge's discretion in sentencing lies within limits prescribed by law); State v. Kelly, 784
P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1989) (discretion is within statutory limits); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d
843, 844 (Utah 1986) (discretion in sentencing is limited by law). The court of appeals
should have reversed the restitution order and remanded the case for a full hearing on the
matter. It failed to do so. That was error.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING ON WAIVER AS A BASIS
FOR AFFIRMING THE MATTER.
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If a trial court considers the merits of an untimely request or objection, the objection
is deemed to be properly preserved for purposes of appeal, as set forth in State v. Johnson,
821 P.2dat 1161.
In that case, defendant failed to raise the corpus delicti rule in a timely manner during
trial. He raised the issue for the first time in a motion for a new trial. LI While such conduct
generally would constitute waiver for purposes of the appeal, see Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1),
this Court ruled that "in disposing of the new trial motion, the trial court did not rely on
waiver, but addressed the merits of the issue." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161.

Thus,

notwithstanding the untimely filing, the matter was properly preserved and the merits would
be addressed on appeal. Id.; see also Matsamas, 808 P.2d at 1053 (trial court considered
defendant's untimely objection, thereby preserving issue for appeal); State v. Seale, 853 P.2d
862, 870 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993): see also State v. Parker. 872 P.2d
1041, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App.) (trial court acted on merits of untimely motion, thereby
preserving issue for appeal), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Johnson applies here. Assuming arguendo Weeks made an untimely objection to
restitution, the trial juge permitted a hearing on the matter and entertained Weeks1 arguments.
(R. 60.) In disposing of Weeks' objections, the trial court "did not rely on waiver, but
addressed the merits of the issues"; the trial court ruled that the restitution amount based only
in statements set forth in a presentence investigation report was fair and reasonable. (R.
60:7.) Although the trial court erred in its ruling and failed to provide a "full hearing" as
required by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (if defendant objects to
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restitution, trial court shall allow full hearing) and Point LB., above, the ruling was sufficient
for the court of appeals to find that the issues were properly preserved for appeal.
The court of appeals nevertheless ruled that Weeks waived the full hearing with an
untimely objection. In finding waiver, the court of appeals stated the following:

fl{10] [B]ecause defendant did not request a full restitution hearing at or before
sentencing and had no good cause not to make the request, he waived his entitlement
to a restitution hearing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d). []
^[11. Defendant argues that the trial court, in effect, waived his waiver because he
asserts the hearing on his motion after sentencing amounted to a restitution hearing.
In support of his position defendant cites to the following cases: State v. Seale. 853
P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding when issue raised in motion for new trial for
first time, and court addressed issue on merits in denying motion and considered
alleged error rather than finding it waived, defendant's right to assert issue on appeal
was resuscitated); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (holding when
defendant waived objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary hearing
granted and judge considered claim, defendant's waiver was effectively waived by
judge); State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (concluding when trial
court addressed issue fully and did not rely on waiver, issue will be considered on
appeal); State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (same); State v.
Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, ^[5, 992 P.2d 995 (holding defendant may appeal
order stemming from full restitution hearing, even though motion for hearing filed ten
days after sentencing); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(holding "trial court acted on the merits of motion and thus de facto considered it
timely").
^[12. However, these cases are all distinguishable from this case. In this case, "[t]he
trial court did not take evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue, but
instead simply denied the Motion to Alter or Amend," and, thereby, did not waive
defendant's earlier waiver of the hearing. Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d
675, 678 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, notwithstanding the trial court's mischaracterization of the hearing in its order, the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing
on the restitution amount, or reconsider the restitution amount. Instead, the court
merely clarified that the restitution amount ordered was based upon the presentence
report. No further inquiry into the restitution amount was made, no evidence was
taken, and the court did not address the issue on the merits.[] Thus, because the court
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did not conduct an evidentiary hearing or even reconsider the restitution amount on
the merits, there was no resuscitation of defendant's earlier waiver. []
Weeks, 2000 UT 273. The court of appeals1 reliance on Estate of Covington v. Josephson,
888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), c e ^ denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995), and Rule 12(d),
Utah Rules ofCriminal Procedure, is misplaced. Weeks, 2000 UTApp 273, ^ 1 0 , 1 2 . That
authority is distinguishable and does not support the court of appeals' ruling here.
In Covington, after parties to a contract dispute filed cross motions for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Covington, 888 P.2d at 676-77.
Defendants subsequently filed a post-summary-judgment motion to alter or amend, which
the trial court "simply denied.1' Id. at 678 and n. 5. On appeal, defendants asked the court
of appeals to consider the merits of the post-summary-judgment motion. It refused to do so
and ruled thatff [r]aising an issue in a post-trial motion - or as in the case here, post-summary
judgment - does not preserve that issue for appeal." Id. at 678.
The doctrine identified by the court of appeals in Covington - that an issue raised
"post-trial" or "post-summary-judgment" is not properly preserved for purposes of appeal —
serves to ensure that parties involved in trial or summary judgment proceedings are bound
by arguments and evidence they deem necessary to the issues. If trial courts permitted
parties to reopen trials and summary judgment motions because counsel failed to raise an
objection during the proceedings, that may improperly permit successive attempts at relitigating matters.
Covington is inapplicable to Weeks' case for several reasons. First, when a defendant
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requests a restitution hearing, the request necessarily must be made during "post-trial"
proceedings. Pursuant to Utah law, restitution is determined by the trial judge after a jury
has rendered a verdict or defendant has entered a guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a) (Supp. 1998) (after conviction court will determine whether restitution is
appropriate as part of sentencing). In the context of this case, where the objection relates to
a post-trial sentencing matter, the doctrine articulated in Covington is inapplicable. See also
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2001) (court may correct an illegal sentence at any time).
Second, a defendant who makes a request for a restitution hearing, timely or not, is
not seeking to reopen resolved issues since the order of restitution has not been tested.
Indeed, the only opportunity to test whether restitution is based in accurate and reliable
information is at the restitution hearing after the trial judge has imposed restitution as part
of sentencing. The restitution hearing accommodates due process; it is in the parties1
interests to have restitution based on reliable, accurate information.
Third, the trial court in Covington did not set a hearing on the motion to alter or
amend judgment, and did not consider argument on the matter or the evidence of record in
denying defendants' request. Rather, the trial court in Covington "simply denied the Motion
to Alter or Amend." Covington, 888 P.2d at 678 n.5. In that regard, the trial court's ruling
in Covington was a determination de facto that defendants waived the matter for purposes
of appeal. See State v. Beason. 2000 UT App 109, ^[14,2 P.3d 459 (recognizing that under
Covington, party's post-summary-judgment motion was not preserved for appeal where trial
court "simply denied the motion without taking evidence or holding a hearing").
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In Weeks' case, after he made a request for the restitution hearing, the trial judge
granted the request for a hearing and set it for October 18. (See Case No. 3049:42-43; Case
No. 2830:38-39; 3239:40-41.) On that date, the trial judge held a hearing and considered the
presentence investigation report and arguments of counsel before ruling that restitution was
M

fair and reasonable." (R. 60.) Thus, unlike the trial judge in Covington, the trial judge here

specifically considered the merits of Weeks' requests and objections before ruling on the
matter. "Because the trial court addressed the alleged error rather than finding it waived, the
court granted defendant relief from his waiver and defendant's right to assert the issue on
appeal was preserved." Beason,2000UTApp 109,1fl5 (citing Bdgard, 830 P.2d at 265-66).
With respect to Rule 12(d), Utah R. Crim. P., it provides the following: "Failure of
the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made
prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver." The court of appeals relied on that
provision in Weeks to find that "because defendant did not request a full restitution hearing
at or before sentencing and had no good cause not to make the request, he waived his
entitlement to a restitution hearing." Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, ^|10.3
Rule 12(d) does not apply to this matter for three reasons: First, Weeks was not
required to make a defense or objection concerning restitution "prior to trial"; second, the
trial court did not "set" a time for making the objection; and third, the trial court did not rely

3

The court of appeals apparently imposed a "good cause" standard to Rule 12(d), where
no such standard is mentioned in the rule.
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on waiver in ruling on the matter. See (R. 60); Beason, 2000 UT App 109,1114-15.
Indeed, once the trial court here determined to provide a hearing to "entertain"
counsel's comments (R. 60:3) and to rule on the merits, any timeliness requirement was
deemed waived and the issues were properly preserved for purposes of appeal. Beason, 2000
UT App 109, H14-15. The trial court's actions were subject to review.
Contrary to the court of appeals' ruling, Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, H10-12, this case
should not have been affirmed on waiver grounds. The court of appeals had sufficient basis
to consider the issues on appeal and to find that the trial court violated Weeks' due process
and statutory rights. Weeks respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of appeals'
ruling, vacate the trial court's restitution order, and remand the case to the trial court for a full
hearing on the restitution issues.
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETATION OF § 76-3-201
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE OR
STATUTORY PURPOSE.
According to the court of appeals, § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) provides that "any request for a
full restitution hearing must be made at or before sentencing." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,
^|9. Also, if defendant fails to make such a request at sentencing he has waived his
entitlement to a restitution hearing. Id. at^jlO.
Contrary to the court of appeals' interpretation, subsection (4)(e) is silent as to when
defendant must object to restitution. Furthermore, it does not suggest that failure to object
at sentencing constitutes waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998).
Specifically, the statute provides that if defendant objects to restitution, "the court
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shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e). The phrase "at the time of sentencing" relates to the trial court's
obligations, where strict adherence to § 76-3-20l(4)(e) would require the court to allow a
"full hearing" at sentencing if defendant objected to the amount in restitution imposed.
In considering application of the statute as interpreted by the court of appeals, if a
defendant requested a full restitution hearing "before sentencing" (Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,
^[9), the request would be improper and premature. According to Utah statutory law, parties
are notified of "recommended" restitution amounts only three days before sentencing. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(b)(ii) and (6)(a) (1999). Thereafter, on the day of sentencing,
defendant is informed for the first time whether the trial court intends to impose restitution
against him and in what amount. (See R. 70:Tab 2:10 (trial judge ordered restitution at
sentencing).) In some instances, defendant will not have an objection to the amount in
restitution imposed. Thus, there will be no need for a full hearing. In other instances,
defendant may be able to engage in informal discovery with the prosecutor in order to
alleviate concerns about the amount and to confirm the evidentiary basis for the award. If
the defendant's concerns are resolved through informal discovery, he likely will not request
a full hearing on the matter.
Practically speaking, a defendant will not have an objection to the imposition or
amount of restitution until after sentencing, when restitution either has or has not been
imposed in an objectionable or unobjectionable amount. It would be improper and premature
for defendant to object to the amount of restitution "before sentencing" as ordered by the
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court of appeals. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, TJ9. Thus, a proper objection to restitution
must necessarily be made after restitution is imposed.
If defendant makes an objection after restitution is imposed, according to the statute
the trial court must allow the full hearing "at the time of sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(e). Since restitution generally is imposed at the time of sentencing, strict adherence
to that provision would create a hardship. That is, strict adherence would require parties to
subpoena witnesses, collect evidence, and prepare arguments on short notice (court and
parties are notified of recommended restitution three days before sentencing (§ 77-18l(6)(a))), on the possibility that defendant may object to restitution at sentencing.
Strict adherence either would require the trial court to accommodate an evidentiary
hearing on a crowded calendar without advanced notice (an objection to restitution imposed
at sentencing would require a full hearing at that time); or it would require trial courts to
anticipate a full hearing at every sentencing on the possibility that restitution may be imposed
and defendant may object. To accommodate the immediacy of the matter, third-party
witnesses also would have to attend every sentencing on the chance they may be called to
testify to defend or refute the restitution award.
In addition to being a hardship, strict adherence would fail to accommodate due
process. The immediacy of the matter (three days from the date parties are notified of the
recommended amounts to sentencing (§ 77-18-l(6)(a))), would not accommodate the
exchange, let alone the review, of evidentiary materials or documents prior to the hearing,
and it would not permit either the state or defense to consider, let alone prepare,
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examinations or arguments to defend or dispute the amount in restitution ordered at
sentencing. See Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017,1028 n.9 (Utah 1996) (restitution hearing
would be held after appropriate notice to defendant and after defendant had access to
materials); see also Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, 1fl|3,5 (sentencing hearing was held in
April 1998, objection to restitution was filed on or about May 14, 1998, and restitution
hearing was in September 1998).
In considering the timeliness requirements and application of § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) in
Weeks1 case, Judge Billings stated the following in her dissent:
The policy behind the timeliness requirement [in the statute] is less significant when,
as here, an objection necessitates a separate evidentiary hearing. 1
1 The state concedes that, had Defendant presented his objection requesting an
evidentiary hearing at his original sentencing hearing, the restitution hearing
could not have taken place immediately because witnesses would have to have
been subpoenaed, evidence gathered, and arguments prepared.
Inasmuch as no objection could be raised until after imposition of restitution, I see no
practical difference between an objection raised at the sentencing hearing and an
objection raised eleven days later — well before the time for a direct appeal has run.
Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, ^22 (Billings, J., dissent) (emphasis in original).
Since strict adherence to § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) would fail to serve due process concerns
and would create a hardship on parties, trial courts, and third-party witnesses, Weeks
maintains the provision should be interpreted in light of its due process concerns and purpose
to provide fairness in sentencing, like other sentencing statutes.
In State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), this Court interpreted Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-1 (1953 as amended), which provided that after a guilty verdict, "the court must
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appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than
ten days after the verdict." Id. at 797 (emphasis added). The defendant in Helm argued that
the trial court's failure to pronounce sentence within the time mandated by statute deprived
the trial court ofjurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 797. This Court disagreed and construed
the statute as follows:
[This] statute should be viewed in harmony with the general rule of statutory
construction: that it should be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose. That
purpose was that there should be no undue or unreasonable delay in the
pronouncement of the sentence, particularly that there should be no imposition of
hardship on the defendant or prejudicial effect upon his rights. Consistent with what
has been said, we think the view which is sound and which comports with the
requirements ofjustice is that the limits so prescribed in the statute are not mandatory
and jurisdictional, but are directory; and that where the sentence is imposed within a
reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's power nor adverse effects upon
the defendant, he should not be entitled to gofree,but should be entitled to have the
correct sentence imposed upon him, with due consideration given to any time he may
have served because of the delay.
14 at 797 (footnote omitted).
In State v. Tvree. 2000 UT App 350, 17 P.3d 587, the court of appeals likewise
considered a sentencing provision. It construed Rule 22(a), Utah R. Crim. P., which
provides that the trial court "shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less
than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.11 Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Notwithstanding
the language of the provision, the court of appeals ruled the statute was directory in effect,
not mandatory. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, ^[15. The court of appeals also stated the
following:
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[The rule] directs the actions of trial courts in a context involving multiple actors —
the court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, defendant, and AP&P. Whereas parties
have only their own interests to further, courts are charged with balancing the needs
of multiple actors and furthering the interests ofjustice. Courts, therefore, should not
be held to the same strictures as individual parties in such situations.
Id. at T|10; see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time).
Since § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) likewise directs the actions of the trial court in sentencing, it
should be construed to provide that when a defendant objects to restitution or requests a "full
hearing" within a reasonable time, there should be no undue delay in the process, no
imposition of hardship on the victim or parties, and no prejudicial effect upon defendant's
rights. The provision is not mandatory but directory in terms of timing. When an objection
or a request for a hearing is made within a reasonable time of the imposition of restitution,
defendant shall be entitled to a full hearing with due consideration given to the needs of
multiple actors, to the need to investigate the matter and to present and examine evidence,
and to the interests ofjustice. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the statutory
purpose and due process.
Finally, whether § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) is construed as provided by the court of appeals or
otherwise, it plainly does not provide that failure to request the hearing "at the time of
sentencing" constitutes waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998);
see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (illegal sentence may be corrected at any time). That is, the
statute does not deny the sentencing judge discretion to entertain a request for a restitution
hearing that is made eleven days after sentencing.
To that end, assuming arguendo Weeks failed to timely object to restitution, he did
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not definitively waive his right to a full hearing under the statute. The sentencing judge had
the discretion to consider the matter on the merits, as he did here. (R. 60.) In this case, the
judge conducted a hearing, considered argument, and ruled on the matter. (Id.)
Inasmuch as the trial judge made an erroneous ruling on the merits and would not
allow Weeks to examine the evidentiary basis for the restitution order, Weeks respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the trial court's ruling and remand the case to the trial court
for a full hearing on the matter.
POINT III. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE CERTAIN
FINDINGS OF RECORD CONCERNING THE RESTITUTION ORDER.
Pursuant to Section 76-3-201, the trial court was required to consider certain factors
in ordering restitution in this case. The statute provides in relevant part the following:
[(4)(a)](ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow
the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
*

*

*

(4)(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
*

*

*

[(4)(c)](iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (8).
*

*

*

[(4)](d)(i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision apart of the court
record.
*

*

*

[(8)](c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to befixedby the court;
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(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
In considering those provisions as they relate to Board of Pardons proceedings, this
Court in Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at 1017, ruled that the Board "must not only consider
the four statutory factors when it orders restitution as a condition of parole, but it must also
comply with the same procedural requirements imposed on a trial court, e.g., it shall make
a record of the reasons for its decision." IdL at 1028; see also Miller v. State, 932 P.2d 618,
621 (Utah Ct.App. 1997).
In State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), reVd on other grounds, 846
P.2d 1276(Utah 1993), the court ofappeals ruled that pursuant to Section 76-3-201, the trial
court "must declare reasons within the statutory framework for awarding or denying
restitution." Haston, 811 P.2d at 936-37. Because the trial court failed in that case to enter
findings on the record concerning defendant's financial resources and ability to pay in
ordering restitution, the court ofappeals had no way to assess compliance with the statute
and ordered remand for additional proceedings and supplementary findings. Id
In State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), this Court read the relevant
statutory provisions set forth above to provide that the trial court must state the reasons for
restitution on the record in light of the statutory factors. This Court ruled that "before
ordering restitution, the court must take into account the financial resources of the

30

defendant."

14 at 1233 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(c)(i)).4 "If the court

determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court
shall make the reasons for the decision apart of the court record." Id. at 1234 (emphasis in
original; citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i)).
We read this requirement to mean that after taking into account the factors listed in
section 76-3-20 l(4)(c) [now subsection (8)], the trial court must take the additional
step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached,
reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the
Ramirez assumption.
In the present case, though the court explained its reasons for imposing
restitution of State Hospital costs incurred during Robertsons period of malingering,
the court did not discuss on the record the reasons for ordering restitution of
extradition costs. Because this error occurred at the sentencing stage, where costs
were imposed, we vacate the portion of the order imposing extradition costs and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings in compliance with section 76-3201(4)(d)(i).
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234; see supra note 4, herein.5

4

Restitution apparently was imposed against Robertson pursuant to the 1994 version of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1223 (following a four-day trial in
1994, Robertson was convicted and trial court imposed restitution). That version of the
statute listed the factors to be considered in imposing restitution at subsection (4)(c), where
the court was required to consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay.
In 1995, the legislature moved the list of factors to subsection (8) and revised subsection (4). In the current version of the statute, the list of factors is made applicable to the
court's consideration via subsection (4)(a)(ii), which requires the court to "follow the criteria
and procedures in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).ff Subsection (4)(c)(iii) in turn provides that
"complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8)," and subsection (4)(d)(i) requires the court to "make the reasons for its
[restitution] decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998).
5

The Court described the "Ramirez assumption" as follows: when "factual issues are
presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the
record, we 'assume that the trier of [the] facts found them in accord with its decision, and we
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In this matter, Weeks argued on appeal that the trial court committed plain error when
it failed to make findings of record concerning the basis for the restitution amount.
See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, <fll5. To establish plain error, an appellant must show that
11

(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the

error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.M State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Weeks argued that an error existed in that the record failed to support compliance with
the language of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) and (8); State v. Labrum,
925 P.2d 937,940-41 (Utah 1996) (plain error exists when a trial court fails to comply with
statutory language); (R. 70 at Tab 2; 60). Because Utah statutory and case law required the
court to consider the factors in determining restitution, the error was obvious. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(4) and (8) (Supp. 1998); Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234; Miller, 932 P.2d at
621: Dept. Empl. Sec, of Indus. Com'n of Utah v. Ninth Circuit Court in and for Cedar City
Dept, 718 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1986); infra Point III.A. and B.
With respect to the prejudice analysis, a reasonable likelihood existed that if the trial

affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it."
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224,1234 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,787 (Utah 1991)).
On the other hand, the "Labrum exception" requires explicit findings of record when
"an ambiguity of the facts makes the assumption unreasonable, [State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d
937,939-40 (Utah 1996)]," or when a prior case or statute requires findings in order that the
appellate court can properly perform its review function. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234.
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court had complied with subsection (8)(c), Weeks would not have been ordered to pay
restitution in the amount imposed by the court, since consideration of the factors would
support that Weeks had no financial resources or ability to pay. See infra Point III.B.
The court of appeals rejected Weeks' arguments on two grounds. Weeks. 2000 UT
App 273,11J16-17. First, it ruled that § 76-3-201 "does not require findings on the record
concerning each of the factors." Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,1J16. Second, it ruled that the
trial court nevertheless met the requirements of § 76-3-201 and Robertson, when it stated "on
the record that restitution was appropriate based on defendant's criminal acts and his criminal
history." Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,1fl6. The court of appeals1 ruling is in error and in
conflict with Utah law, as set forth below.
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING CONCERNING THE FINDINGS ON
THE RECORD IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION
76-3-201 AND ROBERTSON.
As set forth above, this Court has ruled that relevant provisions of Section 76-3-201
require the trial court to consider specific factors when ordering restitution and to "take the
additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached,
reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234. "[I]n
determining whether or not to order restitution, the court is required to consider the financial
resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, the ability
of the defendant to pay restitution, the rehabilitative effect of the payment of restitution, and
other relevant circumstances." Dept. of Empl. Sec, of Indus. Com'n of Utah. 718 P.2d at
784; see also Miller, 932 P.2d at 621 (Board must consider factors); Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715
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n.3 (court must consider defendant's financial resources in determining restitution); Monson,
928 P.2d at 1028-29 (remanding the case in order that the Board of Pardons may "comply
with the statute by giving Monson an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it
has taken into account the appropriate statutory factors").
In a previous case before this Court, the state recognized the obligation of the trial
judge to explicitly note on the record the reasons for restitution in light of the factors set forth
at subsection (8)(c).
[I]t is not clear that Judge Brian considered required statutory factors in making the
restitution order. Judge Brian also did not state the reasons for his decision on the
record as expressly required by statute. Therefore, this issue needs to be remanded
for Judge Brian to enter findings on the restitution order in light of the required
statutory factors.
*

*

*

When determining the amount and other conditions for court-ordered restitution,
section 76-3-20l(8)(c) requires the court to consider 1) the defendant's financial
resources and the burden that restitution will impose in view of defendant's other
obligations; 2) the ability of defendant to pay restitution in installments or on other
conditions fixed by the court; 3) the rehabilitative effect that payment of restitution
will have on the defendant; 4) other circumstances which the court determines would
make restitution inappropriate; and 5) applicable criteria under subsection (8)(b) such
as the amount of the victim's loss. In addition, when determining whether restitution
is appropriate, "the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court
record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i); State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,
1233-34 (Utah 1997). This Court has held that under these provisions, once the court
has taken into account the statutory factors, it must then "take the additional step of
explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the
detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234.
In this case, Judge Brian did not make his reasons for his decision a part of the
record. It also cannot be determined from the record whether Judge Brian considered
the required statutory factors in subsection (8)(c). Therefore, this matter should be
remanded for Judge Brian to enter findings regarding the restitution order in light of
the statutory factors.
(State v. GallL Case No. 960018, State's Brief of Appellee, dated June 2, 1997, at 9,45-46;
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see also 39. Relevant pages from the state's brief in Galli are attached hereto as Addendum
F. At page 39 of the brief, the state recognized that Gallifs presentence investigation report
was made part of the record before Judge Brian during sentencing. Apparently, the state in
Galli did not consider reference to the report without more to be sufficient to satisfy the
factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c)).)
The trial court must be held to specifically noting on the record its consideration of
the statutory factors in ordering restitution. Otherwise, the statutory factors will evade
appellate review and become irrelevant. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1234; see also State v. Nelson,
725 P.2d 1353, 1355 n.3 (Utah 1986) (where statute required trial court to consider factors,
this Court required trial court to enter findings on the record to ensure compliance with
statutory factors); State in the Interest of ClatterbucL 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985)
(same); State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (where statute required trial court to
consider factors, this Court refused to assume compliance where trial court failed to give
adequate weight to information in the record in light of statutory considerations).
Here, the court of appeals determined the statute does not "require findings on the
record concerning each of the factors." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, TJ16.6 The court of
appeals erred in its ruling.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3) (1990) [now § 76-3-201(4)], expressly requires the
trial court to make its reasons for granting restitution a part of the record. The statute
further requires that the trial court consider the defendant's financial resources and the

6

In its decision, the court of appeals incorrectly cited to subsection (8)(b). The factors
at issue on appeal were listed at subsection (8)(c).
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rehabilitative effect of the restitution when determining whether to award restitution.
Corresponding findings should therefore be made on remand. State v. Haston, 811
P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991) (findings should follow the statutory framework).
Starnes. 841 P.2d at 715 n. 3. Inasmuch as the trial court in this case failed to make a record
of its reasons for restitution in light of the statutory factors, it failed to comply with statutory
and case law on the matter. The error was plain and obvious. The court of appeals1 ruling
should be reversed.
B. CONTRARY TO THE COURT OF APPEALS1 RULING, THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT TAKE THE RELEVANT FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION IN
ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THIS CASE.
Weeks maintains that in order to comply with the statutory criteria and procedures,
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(ii) (referencing (4)(c) (referencing (8))), the trial court
was required to "take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the
decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute/' including defendant's
financial resources and ability to pay. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1233-34.
The court of appeals disagreed. It ruled that the trial court complied with the statutory
requirements when it made reference to "defendant's criminal acts and his criminal history"
and "relied on defendant's presentence report in determining restitution." Weeks. 2000 UT
App 273, ffi[16-17. Those considerations were insufficient in this case and under Utah
statutory and case law.
Specifically, in considering the record in this matter, it is unclear how "defendant's
criminal acts and his criminal history" related to imposition of restitution. The trial court's
references to those matters occurred as follows:
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THE COURT: There you have it, Mr. Weeks. There *s no mystery about the fact that
Vm going to obviously commit you to prison, which is probably where you need to be,
at least until you get your head on straight. You've taken now since you were 14 to
develop this style of living, it's going to take you a while [to] undevelop [sic] it.
There being no legal reason why I should not impose sentence, I will do so at
this time. Mr. Weeks, it is the judgment and sentence of this court that you serve a
term provided by law of zero to five years for each of the five separate, excuse me,
five separate third degree felony charges to which you have plead guilty and that you
serve a period of one year each on the two separate Class A misdemeanor crimes to
which you have plead guilty, as has been recommended and simply because of your
age, Mr. Weeks, everybody's entitled to be stupid, but I think you've been pressing the
envelope here.
THE DEFENDANT: I'm (inaudible).
THE COURT: I will order that your terms imposed by this court will be served
concurrent and not consecutively. However, they will be consecutive to what you're
serving at the prison as ordered by Judge Noel. And I will further order that you pay
restitution in the amount of $9,104.35, that you pay a recoupment fee for the use of
your publicly provided lawyer of $250, and I will recommend while you're there that
you receive substance abuse therapy. I will grant you credit, Mr. Weeks, for the time
you serve in custody awaiting disposition of this charge, except for what you've
served out there on Noel's terms at the prison.
(R. 70:Tab 2:9-10 (emphasis added).)
As reflected in the record, the sentencing judge's references to "defendant's criminal
acts and his criminal history" related to the fact that the judge intended to send Weeks to
prison for the crimes. The references do not relate to the restitution ordered in the case. Indeed, the state admitted in papers filed with the court of appeals that when the trial court
made reference to Weeks' criminal history, it was "not specifically addressing its reasons for
restitution." (State's Brief of Appellee, filed May 12, 2000, at pages 8 and 18.) Thus, the
court of appeals' ruling is in error. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[16.
With respect to the presentence investigation report, the court of appeals ruled that
because that was "part of the record" and the trial court made reference to the report in
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imposing restitution, "we can reasonably assume that the court" made the requisite statutory
findings for restitution. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[17. The court of appeals relied on
Robertson to support such an assumption. That case is distinguishable.
In Robertson, this Court considered two separate restitution awards. Robertson, 932
P.2d at 1233. Robertson was ordered to pay restitution for costs incurred in connection with
a State Hospital competency examination and for extradition. Id.
With respect to the hospital costs, this Court recognized they were incurred pursuant
to statutory law, which made defendant responsible to the hospital for such costs "if he
requested a competency exam." Id at 1233 n.8. Thus, since Robertson requested the
competency examination, he would be liable under statutory law for the costs.
In addition, in considering the hospital costs, this Court found that "the [trial] court
explained" on the record its reasons for imposing "restitution of State Hospital costs incurred
during Robertson's period of malingering." Id. at 1234. Specifically, the trial court
considered information set forth in the presentence investigation report and evidence in the
record that defendant had the ability to pay the costs incurred by the State Hospital, where
the record supported that defendant held jobs before incarceration and was "employed at the
State Hospital coffee shop during his pretrial incarceration." Id.
With respect to the extradition costs in Robertson, this Court did not consider a review
of the report to be sufficient to satisfy consideration of the statutory factors on the record.
In addition, the Court refused to assume compliance with the statute. Rather, this Court
vacated that portion of the restitution order and remanded the matter to the trial court "for
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further proceedings in compliance with section 76-3-201(4)(d)(i)." Robertson, 932 P.2d at
1234. "We read [the section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i)] requirement to mean that after taking into
account the factors listed in section 76-3-20 l(4)(c), the trial court must take the additional
step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the
detailed factors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the use of the Ramirez
assumption" Id. at 1234; see supra note 5.
As with the extradition costs in Robertson, the trial court's review of the report in
Weeks' case cannot satisfy consideration of the statutory factors on the record. Here, there
is no indication from the record that in ordering restitution, the trial judge considered Weeks'
financial resources, the burden that payment of restitution would impose on Weeks with
regard to other obligations, and Weeks' ability to pay. (See R. 60; 70 at Tab 2); see GalH,
967 P.2d at 938 (trial court did not give adequate weight to facts in light of statutory factors,
thereby requiring reversal). While subsection (8)(c) provides that the court "shall consider"
the factors listed in that provision, the silent record in this case does not support that the court
gave any thought to the matter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(ii), (4)(c)(iii), (4)(d)(i),
and (8)(c).
Indeed, if the trial court had considered the presentence report in reviewing the
statutory factors, the court would have discovered no financial resources or ability to pay.
In that regard, the trial court likely would not have ordered restitution or would have ordered
it in a lesser amount.
Specifically, the report reflects that Weeks was financially destitute. He was 20 years
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old at the time of sentencing and incarceration. ("Presentence Investigation Addendum11 at
1.) He had no financial resources and no assets. (Id.at 13.) Weeks' job history reflected
that he was last employed two years earlier in 1997 as a "prep cook" making $5.50 an hour.
(Attachment to "Presentence Investigation Addendum1' at 16.) Also, the attachment to the
report indicated that Weeks may have been assessed restitution in a previous criminal matter
in the amount of $3,732. (See Attachment to "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 8.)
The earlier restitution award would be a limiting factor on Weeks' ability to pay.
The report reflected that since Weeks was a juvenile, he held five separate jobs for
only a few months before he was fired or quit. Also, Weeks was "kicked out" of his parents'
home at age 13, and he believed the "highest grade he actually completed was the eighth."
(Attachment to "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 9-11, 13-17.)
Because the trial judge here made no reference to the presentence investigation report
as it related to Weeks' financial resources or ability to pay, and because the presentence
investigation report does not support Weeks' ability to pay, there is no basis for assuming
compliance with the statutory factors. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224-25 (there is no basis
to assume compliance with the statute if there are ambiguities in the facts and/or the law
requires compliance on the record with the statute); GallL 967 P.2d at 938 (record supports
that trial court did not give adequate weight to statutory factors, thereby requiring reversal).
Under the court of appeals' analysis, the trial court's purported consideration of the
statutory factors in Weeks' case escapes appellate review. See Nelson, 725 P.2d at 1356 n.3
(where statute required trial court to consider factors, this Court required trial court to enter
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findings on the record to ensure compliance with statute); Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d at 1081.
The court of appeals' ruling is in error. Weeks' respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the court of appeals' ruling and remand the case to the trial court for consideration
of the factors on the record pursuant to the statute.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Weeks respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the court of appeals' ruling in the matter, vacate the trial court's order of restitution, and
remand this case for a full hearing and proper findings.
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(1953). However, there is "no essential difference-between "hearing incident to the defense monon for review to
section 76-1- 44 and the current statute, section 76*2-202. determine appropnate resntunon'*) was held. At that
State v. Shupe, 554 P.2d 1322,1323 (Utah 1976).
hearing, defendant's counsel stated that "there are
amounts that were being requested that weren't
supported by evidence in terms of damage, and that
Cite as
supposedly there was some victim reparation amount
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 57
that . . . [wasn't] legally applicable." The defense
attorney continued "I don't see those in the
IN THE
presentence report I don't know if your Honor had an
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
amount that you came up with at sentencing because
my files don't reflect the resntunon." The court
STATE of Utah,
replied by referencing amounts listed in the
Plaintiff and Appellee,
presentence report1 The defense attorney requested
v.
further documentanon as to the factual basis and
Lance Michael WEEKS,
support for those amounts.
Defendant and Appellant
J5 The court then stated:
Given the circumstances, the time of the
No. 990979-CA
sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the
FILED: October 5,2000
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance
2000 UTApp 273
of the evidence to myself, the factfinder,that
the sums sought for resntunon are fair and
Third District, Salt Lake Department
reasonable. Given what I have reviewed, that
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
being the presentence report,^ ] as well as the
orders m the matter, as well as now having
ATTORNEYS:
heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded
Linda M. Jones and Scott C. Williams, Salt Lake
and now [am] persuaded that preponderance
City, for Appellant
of the evidence burden has been met, that the
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake
number I have ordered as resntunon is fair
City, for Appellee
and reasonable. Consequently the monon to
modify the-I will characterize it as a monon
Before Judges Greenwood Billings, and Davis.
to modify the order of resntunon is denied.
The order denying defendant's monon was entered on
This opinion is subject to revision before final October 23, 1999, and defendant appeals.
publication in the Pacific Reporter
II. ANALYSIS
16 Defendant makes three arguments: (1) he was
DAVIS, Judge:
entitled to a full resntunon hearing; (2) the trial court
11 Appellant Lance Michael Weeks appeals the trial failed to make adequate findings pursuant to the
court's denial of his post-judgment Motion For statutory factors when it ordered resntunon; and (3)
Review Hearing m which he requested a resntunon there was plain error in the manner m which
hearing. We affirm.
resntudon was ordered.
I. BACKGROUND
17 An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's
12 Defendant pleaded guilty on July 6,1999 to seven resnrution order ''unless it exceeds that prescribed by
charges arising out of several incidents including high law or otherwise abused its discrenon." State v.
speed chases from the police, stealing cars, and Schweitzer, 943 P 2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
possessing methamphetamine. As part of a plea It is within the discrenon of the tnai court to impose
bargain, the State dismissed several counts and sentence, which may include a fine, restitunon,
defendant agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges. No probation or imprisonment See Utah Code Ann. §
promise was made as to defendant's prison nme, but 76- 3-201(2) SL (4) (1999); State v Snyder•, ^47 P.2d
the State made clear that ;t would request consecutive 417,420 (Utah 1987). "However, upon convicnon of
terms. No mennon was made of restitution during the a crime which has resulted in pecuniary damages, :n
plea colloquy
addition to any other sentence imposed, the trial court
^3 On September 10,1999, defendant was sentenced is statutorily mandated to order the payment of
to zero-to- five-years for each offense to be served resntunon unless the court finds that restitution is
concurrently. The judge -further orderfed] that inappropriate." Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420; see also
[defendant] pay resntunon in the amount of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999).
$9,104.35, [ana] that [defendant] pay a recoupment 18 Under both the United States and the Utah State
fee for the use of [defendant's] publicly provided Consntunons, due process requires criminal
lawyer of S250
" It is clear that defendant read proceedings including sentencing to be based upon
the presentence report which set oui the amount of accurate and rcasonaoly reliable .nformanon. See
damages caused by mm; r.owever, none of the parties, Statev Gomez, SS7° :d~353. 354 (U:ah i994) Thus,
including defendant, discussed or objected to the "[fundamental onnciples of orocedurai fairness *n
resntunon order aunng sentencing.
sentencing reouire that a defendant na\e "he ngnt to
14 Eleven aa»s after sentencing, defendant filed a examine and challenge :he«ccurac\ and renaci I it\ oi
Motion For Review Hearing 'n which ne reauested the factual nforrnation ^Don 'vh:ch his ^e *ence s
that the court scnedule 'a Resntunon [sic] hearing on
the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of based." Id at S55 Howc.er, procedural fairness n
resntunon claimed oy \he Stare.' On October ! 8, sentencing 's satisfied when '[defendant had a full
*o examine ana challenge ~I "acr-ai
1999, the review hearing < which the court called a opportune
information apon wn*cn rhe court based his
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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sentence." Id.
Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah CL App.
19 It is proper for the trial coun to impose restitution 1994). Here, notwithstanding the trial court's
at sentencing unless defendant objects to its mischaractenzation of the hearing in its order, the
imposition and requests a full hearing on the amount court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
at that time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) restitution amount, or reconsider the restitution
(1999); State v. Stayer, 706 ?.2d 611,612 (Utah Ct amount. Instead, the court merely clarified that the
App. 1985) (per curiam). In this regard, Utah Code restitution amount ordered was based upon the
Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(e) (1999) states: "If the defendant presentence report. No further inquiry into the
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution amount was made, no evidence was taken,
the restitution, the coun shall at the time of and the court did not address the issue on die merits.3
sentencing allow the defendant a fuil hearing on the Thus, because die court did not conduct an
issue/ Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute is evidentiary hearing or even reconsider the restitution
clear—any request for a full restitution hearing must amount on the merits, there was no resuscitation of
be made at or before sentencing. Cf. Monson v. defendant's earlier waiver.6
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (holding 113 Defendant next argues that the trial court did
no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant not make the appropriate findings when ordering
did not object to order of restitution or request a restitution. As for findings concerning restitution,
hearing.); State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (1999) states: "In
Ct. App. 1998) (holding defendant entitled to full determining the monetary sum and other conditions
restitution hearing where he requested it at for complete restitution, the coun shall consider all
sentencing).
relevant facts, including: (i) the cost of the damage or
J10
Defendant did not object, question, or even loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
mention restitution at sentencing. It is clearfromthe destruction of property of a vicnm of the offense. " In
record that defendant closely read the presentence addinon, the coun shall consider the financial
report which contained the recommended restitunon resources of the defendant, his ability to pay
amount, which is the exact amount that the judge restitution, and the means by which he can pay. See
adopted when ordering restitution. Thus, prior to id. §76-3-20 l(8)(c).
sentencing, defendant was well aware of the 114
However, defendant never challenged the
recommended restitution amount. Nothing in the restitution award, or the basis of the award during
record suggests that he lacked the opportunity to sentencing, and he did not allege unusual
object or request a hearing before, during, or after the circumstances justifying his failure to do so. "If the
court imposed that amount.3 Thus, because defendant trial court, as defendant alleges, enoneously failed to
did not request a full restitution hearing at or before consider defendant's paltry financial resources before
sentencing and had no good cause not to make the ordering [restitution], defendant should have
request, he waived his entitlement to a restitution immediately brought that error to the attention of the
hearing. See Utah R. Cnm. P. 12(d).4
sentencing judge. If defendant was denied relief at
^11
Defendant argues that the trial court, in effect, that time, he could have taken direct appeal." James
waived his waiver because he asserts the hearing on v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 574 (Utah Ct App. 1998)
his motion after sentencing amounted to a restitution (emphasis added), cert, denied sub. nom., James v.
hearing. In support of his position defendant cites to Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). In addition, "there
the following cases: State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,870 is ample record evidence,fromwhich the trial court
(Utah 1993) (concluding when issue raised in motion could have found that restitution was proper." State v.
for new trial for first time, and coun addressed issue Stayer, 706 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).
on merits in denying motion and considered alleged 115
Defendants final argument is that it was plain
error rather than finding it waived, defendant's right error for the trial coun to fail to consider die statutory
to assert issue on appeal was resuscitated); State v. factors when restitutior. was ordered. Because the trial
Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (holding court was given the opportunity to correct the alleged
when defendant waived objection to introduction of error m the context of defendant's motion, we will
evidence but evidentiary hearing granted and juage address the issue on appeal.
considered claim, defendant's waiver was effectively ^16 There was no reversible error here. Utah Zode
waived by judge); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, Ann. § 76-3- 201(8)(b) (1999) does not require
1161 (Utah 1991) (concluding when trial court findings on die record concerning each of the factors.
addressed issue fully and did not rely on waiver, issue Unlike statutes that require findings on die record,
will be considered on appeal); State v. Matsamas, 808 section 76-3-201 (8)(b) merely lists the factors which
P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (same); State v. must be considered, and contains no such
Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343 ,«5, 992 P.2d 995 requirement. Instead, Utah Code Ann.
(holding defendant may appeal order stemming from §76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) (1999) states: "If the court
full restitution heanng, even though motion for determines that restitution is appropriate or
hearing filed ten days after sentencing); State v. inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall
Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) make the reasons for the decision a part of the court
(holding "tnai court acted on the merits of motion and record." Here, die trial court stated on die record that
thus de facto considered ir tirneiy").
resntution was appropriate based on defendant's
112
However, these cases are ail disnnguishable criminal acts and his criminal history.
from this case. In this case, '*[t]he rnai court did not 117
Furthermore, die trial court relied on
take evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's presentence report in determining
issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter restitunon. As in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219
or Amend," and, thereby, did not waive defendant's (Utah 1997), "[pjnor to the imposition of restitution
earlier waiver of the heanng. Estate of Covington v. costs at the sentencing heanng, the trial court
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argued that amounts ordered for restitution lacked objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my
evidentiary support and requested documentation for opinion, persuasive.
die damages and a hearing. The State argued that the K27 Additionally, the majority quotes selectively
amounts were reflected in the presentence from State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985), for
investigation report and that the amounts, though the proposition that we may assume the trial court
estimates, were reasonable. The trial court ruled from considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the
record supports the trial courts conclusion. However,
the bench:
the full quotefromStayer reads:
Given the circumstances, the time of the
In the case before us, there is ample record
sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the
evidence, from which the trial court could
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance
have found that restitution was proper.
of the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that
Notwithstanding the mandate of the statute
the sums sought for restitution are fair and
that the trial court's reasons be included as
reasonable.
part of its order, we believe that the failure to
Given what I have reviewed, that being
do so in this case was harmless error.
the presentence report, as well as the orders in
the matter, as well as now having heard
Nonetheless, we draw attention to this
arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and
requirement for future guidance of the
[am] now persuaded that preponderance of
sentencing courts.
the evidence burden has been met, that the
Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
numbers I have ordered as restiturion is fair
«|28 Subsequent cases from our supreme court
and reasonable. Consequendy the motion to
make clear that record findings under section
modify the-I will characterize it as a motion
76-3-201 are mandatory so that we may no longer
to modify the order of restitution is denied.
assume that the trial court considered the enumerated
On October 28,1999, the court entered an "Order Re: factors. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234
Restitution Hearing," which states:
(Utah 1997) (holding section 76-3-201 is exception to
The Court having heard evidence and
general rule that appellate courts "upholdQ the trial
arguments of counsel, and being otherwise
court even if it failed to make findings on the record
fully advised in the premises hereby finds by
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the
a preponderance of the evidence that the
court actually made such findings"); Monson v.
original order in the Judgment and
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028-29 (Utah 1996)
Commitment in this case is the proper amount
(remanding for explanation of statutory factors in
to be ordered as restitution and hereby
resntunon order although defendant did not object to
affirms that order and denies defendant's
order).
motion.
129 Accordingly, although the trial court
(Emphasis added.)
discussed some of the statutory factors on the record,
125
I believe the foregoing establishes the trial the court did not explain on the record its evaluation
court did not rely on waiver but instead addressed the of Defendant's ability to pay. Under Robertson and
merits of Defendant's motion objecting to the amount Monson, we cannot assume, as the majority does, that
of restiturion: Defendant requested a "review the trial court considered factors it did not discuss on
heaTing,,; the court scheduled a "restitution hearing"; the record.
the parties argued the validity of the evidentiary basis f30 Finally, 1 wish to clarify potentially confusing
of the restitution award; and the court ruled. dicta in footnote three of the majority opinion. That
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred by section of the majority opinion purports to address
reconsidering the order of restitution without giving whether the trial court committed plain error by not
Defendant the required evidentiary hearing providing granting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant's actual
an opportunity to present evidence and cross examine argument, and the issue the majority actually
witnesses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) addresses, is whether the trial court committed plain
(1999).4 Because the trial court did not provide error by not considering the statutorily mandated
Defendant an evidentiary hearing, I would vacate the factors when evaluating restitution. Although I agree
restitution order and remand for an evidentiary that remand for an evidentiary hearing for the latter
hearing on the amount of resntution.
would not be required, see Monson,92% P.2d at 1028
^26
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion (Utah 1996),5 remand for an evidentiary hearing is
that we need not remand for findings related to clearly the remedy if the error was in failing to hold
Defendant's ability to pay the restitution assessed. See a requested evidentiary hearing. See State v. Haga,
id* The majority cites this court's opinion in State v. 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Galetka, 965 P.2d 567,574 (Utah CL App. 1998), for 131
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the
the proposition that remand is not required. Galetka majority opinion.
is clearly distinguishable in that it involved a petition
for writ of habeas corpus filed three yean after the
Judith iVf. Billings, Judge
defendant's conviction, see id. at 569, and the
defendant neither challenged the resntution dunng
sentencing nor appealed it. See id. at 574. Galetka 1. The State concedes that, had Defendant presented his
was decided under the well-established rule that objection requesting an evidentiary hearing at his original
courts will not consider an issue on a petition for writ sentencing hearing, the resntution hearing could not have
taken place immediately because witnesses would have to
of habeas corpus that could have been addressed at have
been subpoenaed, evidence gathered, and arguments
tnal or on direct appeal. See id. (citing Codianna v.prepared.
Moms, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)). Dicta in 2. Indeed, if the court thinks the statute is concerned
Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an
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considered the information set forth in the
presentence report" Id. at 1234; see also State v.
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, S55 (Utah 1994) ("A copy of
die presentence investigation report was provided to
defendant prior to [sentencing]. Defendant had the
opportunity to examine the report and challenge its
contents and recommendations,"). In Robertson, the
supreme court also considered that the trial court
"declined to impose any fine." Robertson, 932 P.2d at
1234. The Robertson court stated, "[although the
court did not make findings relating to [defendant's]
financial condition part of the record, we can
reasonably assume that the court actually made such
findings." Id at 1235.7 Here, the presentence report
was a part of the record and at the hearing on
defendant's waiver, the thai court stated that it relied
on the report to determine the amount of restitution.
Finally, the trial court did not impose a fine;
therefore, based on the record, "we can reasonably
assume that the court made such findings." Id.*
CONCLUSION
%l&
By not objecting to the restitution amount and
requesting a hearing thereon at or prior to sentencing,
defendant waived his right to a full restitution
hearing, and the trial court properly denied his
motion. Furthermore, in accordance with the effect of
Robertson, the record allows us to assume the court
made appropriate findings relative to defendant's
financial condition.

8. Even if we were to conclude error existed, the remedy
would not be a restitution hearing as defendant suggests.
When a record has not been made concerning the reason for
the amount of restitution, the appropriate remedy "is not to
vacate the order of restitution" but to order *he trial court to
comply with the statute by giving "an expiananon of its
decision which demonstrates that it has taken into account
the appropriate statutory factors." Monson v. Carver, 928
P.2d 1017,1028 (Utah 1996).

BILLINGS, Judge (dissenting):
120
1 respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion.
121
First, I disagree that Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-201(4) requires a defendant to raise an
objection at the sentencing hearing. T h e purpose of
requiring a properly presented objection is to 'putQ
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allowQ
the opportunity for correction at that time in the
course of the proceeding.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d
358,359 (Utah Ct App. 1993) (alteration in original)
(quoting Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah
Ct App. 1989)). This policy is a general corollary of
our refusal to entertain an issue for the first time on
appeal. The timeliness requirement of this doctrine
prevents undue delay in litigation. Accordingly,
objection to hearsay evidence, for example, must be
made at the time die evidence is proffered; otherwise,
the objection is waived.
122
The policy behind the timeliness requirement
James Z. Davis, Judge
is less significant when, as here, an objection
necessitates a separate evidentiary heanng.l Inasmuch
tl9
I CONCUR:
as no objection could be raised until after imposition
of restitution, I see no praencal difference between an
Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge
objection raised at the sentencing hearing and an
objection raised eleven days later-well before the
time for direct appeal has run.
w
,,
1. The presentence report listed under resutuhon the ^23
I read the statute not as emphasizing judicial
specific amounts of damage and stated that the source of
economy
but as emphasizing due process concerns.2
information was the prosecutor's records, the three victims,
This
is
of
particular concern in this case. Restitution
and Liberty Mutual Insurance.
2» The presentence report also lists defendant's prior was ordered on the basis of damage amounts found in3
employment, the last being a S5.50/hour job which ended Defendant's presentence investigation report.
in June 1997. As for his financial situation, the report states Restitution was thus based on undocumented double
that defendant has been incarcerated "[ajnd therefore, has hearsay proffered by the victims, and Defendant was
no income and no expenses . . . he has no debts and no deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the
assets, either."
3. Defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to cross victims as to either the identity or valuation of the
examine witnesses or have a restitution hearing; instead, he items stolen or the reasonableness of the repair costs.
124
Even if section 76-3-201 (4)(e) requires that
waived that opportunity.
4- The dissent suggests that timely objection to proposed an objection be raised at sentencing, I would hold that
restitution and a request for a full hearing thereon is not as the trial court waived any objection to the timeliness
significant as timeliness in other areas, thereby leaving the of Defendant's motion. The record reveals the
time within which a restitution heanng could be requested following sequence of events. The trial court
apparently open-ended.
sentenced and imposed restitution on Defendant on
5. As in Covington, argument in support of defendant's
motion necessarily addressing the merits thereof, should not September 10,1999. On September 21,1999, eleven
be confused with an evidentiary heanng. See Estate of days later, Defendant filed in the District Court the
Covington v. Josephson. 388 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah Ct following "Monon for Review Heanng":
COMES NOW the Defendant, LANCER
App. 1994).
6. The fact that the court did not specifically rely on waiver
MICHEL WEEKS [sic], bv and through his
as the basis for denial oi defendant's monon is of no
counsel of record. MATTHEW G. NIELSEN,
consequence because we may affirm the trial court's ruling
hereby requests pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
"if it is sustamaoie on any iegai ground . . . even [if
§76-3-201(4He) (1998), this Court to
different] from :hat stated jy :fte aiai court.'' Limb v.
schedule a Resntution heanng on the grounds
Federaiea Milk Producers Ass «, 22 Utah 2d 222,461 ?.2d
that defendant objects :o :he amount of
290, 293 n.2i 1969).
resntution claimed by the State.
7. The Robertson court so heid, notwithstanding language
therein, apparently confusing :he mandate ot Utah Coae On September 30. 1999, the mal court issued a
Ann. § 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i> \ 1997) with the provisions of "Notice of Restitution Heanng,' ana that heanng was
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- :0WS)(bj(i997).
heid on October 13. i 999. At the neanne, Defendant
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primarily with the timing of an objection, it should require
that the objection be lodged a reasonable time befort the
sentencing hearing so that the trial court may "at the Htm of
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the
[restitution] issue." Utah Code Arm. $ 76~3-20](4Xc)
(1999)(emphasis added). This is clearly not what the statute
requires.
3. One victim was awarded restitution of S500 for
unspecified personal property stolen from a victim's car.
Another victim was awarded restitution of SI500 for a
stolen radio, damage to the radio wiring, unspecified stolen
personal, property, and scratches and dents to the car,
although repairs had not been effected and die amounts
were catenated by the victim.
4. Section 76-3-20l(4Xe) provides: "If the Defendant
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow
die defendant a full hearing on the issue."
5. The Monson court remanded the matter to the Board of
Pardons and Parole with instructions "to comply with die
[restitution] statute by giving [defendant] an explanation of
its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into
account the appropriate statutory factors." Monson, 928
P.2d at 1028. The court did not remand for an evidentiary
hearing because it held that Monson had not requited a
hearing from the board, but only made that request in a
subsequent habeas corpus petition to the district court See
id. at 1029.
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ADDENDUM C

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing —
Definitions*
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.

(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(hi) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4Xc) and (4)(d).
(hi) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.

(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a Hen when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to mterest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply*
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(aXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) S125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle seventy unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances m aggravation or mitigation or

presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec* 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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3

THE COURT:

Let's go to the matter of State

4

I of Utah vs. Lance Michael Weeks.
I

5

| you're appearing by way of having been drafted by this

Mr. Bellesandro,

6

Court in this matter, I assume, to some extent, at

7

least.

8

MR. MORGAN:

9
10

Your Honor, I volunteered

instead of Mr. Bellesandro this morning.
[

11

THE COURT:

And we have Mr. Williams here,

as well as Weeks in the holding cell, I believe.

12

MR. MORGAN:

13

Right, I believe he's in there

talking to his client.

14

THE COURT:

15

Okay.

Mr. Williams, you're

appearing in this matter on behalf of the defendant?

16

MR. WILLIAMS:

I am, your Honor.

i

17

THE COURT:

And you are Lance Michael Weeks;

l

18

is that correct?

19

MR. WEEKS:

20
21

THE COURT:
lawyer, correct?

Yes, sir.
Mr. Williams is still your

i

22
23
24
25

'

MR. WEEKS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
I assume he may be for the rest

of his natural born life.
MR. WEEKS:

Just the other day I found out

3

my old lawyer isn't going to be a DA, so I guess he's
my lawyer.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Yeah, I've got this case as a

reassignment after Matt Nielsen (inaudible) released
(inaudible).
THE COURT:

I appreciate your clarification.

Nielsen was the previous lawyer and now you're new.

I

assumed, Mr. Williams, that you were his lawyer during
the course of the pleadings that were taken back-MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

No, I wasn't.

It's nice to have you here, and

Mr. Weeks, that's acceptable with you; is it not, sir?
MR. WEEKS:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

This matter was set for hearing

incident to the defense motion for review to determine
appropriate restitution.

Given the fact that Mr. Gill

is not available, I've asked Mr. Morgan to stand in on
the matter, and I'll entertain your comments, Mr.
Williams, at this point in support of the motion that
you filed.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Let me just note, your Honor,

for the record again that it was actually the last act
of Mr. Nielsen before it was transferred (inaudible) .
THE COURT:

What a (inaudible).

MR. WILLIAMS:

I'm in a tough position

4

because frankly, the only figure that I have to work
with is the $9,104.35 figure in the presentence
report.

I talked with Mr. Nielsen today to try to

understand where we were and to try to inform counsel
for the State that (inaudible) to stand in on this
hearing, too.

To help everybody understand, he said

there was some large figure that he quoted that was
much larger than that, but I don't have any
understanding right now of what the actual figure is
to be honest.
At any rate, that he believes that there are
amounts that were being requested that weren' t
supported by evidence in terms of damage, and that
supposedly there was some victim reparation amount
that he didn't think were legally applicable.
I don't see those in the presentence report.
I don't know if your Honor had an amount that you came
up with at sentencing because my files don't reflect
the restitution.
THE COURT:

Well, I can clarify that to some

extent for you, Mr. Williams.

The sentence judgment

commitment that I entered in this matter ordered
restitution in the amount of $9,104.35.

That number

is the sum of three separate categories identified in
the presentence report.

5

There were victim impact sums in the amount
of $1500 each to one, Hatten and one, Garcia for auto
damages as a result of thefts of this defendant, and
then the $6104.3 5 to Liberty Mutual Insurance carrier,
which was the carrier for the Garcia vehicle for
repairs incident to the conduct of this defendant.
Now those three sums totaled the $9100 plus
dollars that I ordered in the way of restitution at
the time of the sentencing.
MR. WILLIAMS:

I think, your Honor, that the

question then becomes whether or not - - o r what was
the factual basis and the support in terms of
(inaudible) paperwork for those amounts.

When things

are rounded off amounts of $1500 brings some question
in my mind just looking at this.
With the (inaudible) Garcia, which perhaps
is a deductible is the only thing I would think that
would explain a rounded off figure like that, that
doesn't seem to apply to David Hatten.

If I could be

so presumptuous, I guess I would presume that that's
what was going through Mr. Nielsen's mind and that's
why he requested a hearing and requested some
documentation, and that hasn't arrived at this point,
so I don't know what the State's documentary basis for
for the State--

6

MR. MORGAN:

Your Honor, I have the

statements in the report saying that Mr. Hatten lost
personal items and repairs that totaled $1500, and
more repair payments from Mr. Garcia would indicate
that personal items of $500 were missing, a $500
deductible was paid, and an additional $500 to repair
and painting of the car to make it match.

Those don't

sound like unreasonable sums, and they sound -- even
if they are estimates, they're probably only pennies
off or probably short, so (inaudible) as to this type
of conduct.
I'd ask the Court to order that the
restitution remain based upon the findings of police
and the presentence report, and that if there are
further adjustments then the board of pardons might be
the right place to take care of these matters.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, I think that the

last statement may be accurate and it may be a good
idea, but I would just submit that it ought to go up
to them on total determination, if the board of
pardons determines it, let them determine it all, but
I don't think if there's a factual basis today in
response to defendant's motion sufficient for your
Honor to make the finding (inaudible) restitution
figures that are there.

7

I think the presentence report ought to be
helpful, especially to the Court and counsel as to
what it seeks to prove or document evidence that would
support the figures, but I don't think it's sufficient
as of today for your Honor to actually enter an order
(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Williams.

Given

the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the
persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I
believe, by preponderance of the evidence to myself,
the fact finder, that the sums sought for restitution
are fair and reasonable.
Given what I have reviewed, that being the
presentence report, as well as the orders in the
matter, as well as now having heard arguments of
counsel, I was persuaded and now persuaded that
preponderance of the evidence burden has been met,
that the numbers I have ordered as restitution is fair
and reasonable.

Consequently the motion to modify

the -- I will characterize it as a motion to modify
the order of restitution is denied.
If you will prepare an appropriate order,
counsel.

Thank you for your efforts, everyone, we'll

be in recess.
(Hearing concluded)
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER RE: RESTITUTION HEARING
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LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,

Hon. Frederick

Defendant.
This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objecting to the Order of
Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being present and
represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by its counsel The Court
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment
and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms
that order and denies defendant's motion.
DATED this ^Wday of October, 1999.

Approved as to form:

tt Williams

^

'

ORDER RE: RESTITUTION HEARING
Case No. 991902830
Page 2
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re: Restitution
Hearing was delivered to Scott Williams, Attorney for Defendant Lance Michael Weeks, at 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the $> day of October, 1999.
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LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,
Hon. Frederick
Defendant.
This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objecting to the Order of
Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being present and
represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by its counsel. The Court
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment
and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms
that order and denies defendant's motion.

" AS-

DATED this j£#day of October, 1999.

Approved as to form:

C-Scttt Williams
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Hearing was delivered to Scott Williams, Attorney for Defendant Lance Michael Weeks, at 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the / P day of October, 1999.
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LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,

Hon. Fredenck

Defendant.
This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objecting to the Order of
Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being present and
represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by its counsel. The Court
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment
and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms
that order and denies defendant's motion.
DATED this ^tifMay of October, 1999.
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holding a full hearing on the restitution issue because defendant objected only to the
legality of the restitution order and there was no need for an evidentiary hearing on that
issue. Furthermore, defendant did not request a hearing on the issue.
However, it is not clear that Judge Brian considered required statutory factors in
making the restitution order. Judge Brian also did not state the reasons for his decision on
the record as expressly required by statute. Therefore, this issue needs to be remanded for
Judge Brian to enter findings on the restitution order in light of the required statutory
factors.
Point V: Judges Rigtrup and Iwasaki did not abuse their discretion by imposing
consecutive prison sentences. The gravity of defendant's crimes and his two flights to
avoid prosecution justify the consecutive sentences, even though defendant's prior criminal
record was insignificant and even though he was a model citizen while a fugitive from
justice. The record also clearly establishes that in imposing the consecutive sentence,
Judge Rigtrup did not impermissibly consider a homicide for which defendant had not been
convicted.

9

Although the presentence report did not mention defendant's family as victims or
the $40,000 they had forfeited, it did mention that defendant had absconded from Utah
after bailing out ofjail and that he had been a fugitive for nearly three years (B-PSI at 10).
The presentence report did not make any recommendations regarding restitution to
defendant's family.
On appeal, defendant argues 1) that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(Supp. 1996),
Utah's Restitution Statute, does not permit a sentencing court to order restitution for a bond
forfeiture due to the defendant's flight, 2) that defendant should have been afforded a full
hearing on the issue so that he could present relevant evidence, and 3) that Judge Brian did
not consider criteria required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Supp. 1996) (Br. App.
36-41).
A. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. 6 76-3-201 allows a sentencing court to require
a defendant to repay his family for a bond forfeiture resulting from his unlawful flight from
the jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1996) provides
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement.
The question in this case is whether defendant's flight from the jurisdiction amounted to a
criminal activity that resulted in pecuniary damages and whether defendant's family could
be classified as victims under the statute.
The statute defines "criminal activities" as "any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to
39

Under these circumstances it does not appear that an evidentiary hearing was
necessary. Therefore, Judge Brian did not err in not providing a full hearing.
C, This issue should be remanded for Judge Brian to consider the appropriate criteria in
imposing restitution and to enter written findings.
Defendant argues that Judge Brian abused his discretion by failing to take into
account various statutory factors when he imposed the restitution order.
When determining the amount and other conditions for court-ordered restitution,
section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) requires the court to consider 1) the defendant's financial resources
and the burden that restitution will impose in view of defendant's other obligations; 2) the
ability of defendant to pay restitution in installments or on other conditions fixed by the
court; 3) the rehabilitative effect that payment of restitution will have on the defendant; 4)
other circumstances which the court determines would make restitution inappropriate; and
5) applicable criteria under subsection (8)(b) such as the amount of the victim's loss. In
addition, when determining whether restitution is appropriate, "the court shall make the
reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i);
State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1233-34 (Utah 1997). This Court has held that under
these provisions, once the court has taken into account the statutory factors, it must then

Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(c) (Supp. 1996). He claims that the failure of the presentence
report in his case to contemplate the restitution order denied him an opportunity to present
testimony, evidence or other information as he was entitled to under Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1(7). Defendant, however, never alleged below or in his opening brief that the
$40,000 figure is unreliable. He also does not allege what evidence he would have put on
if given the opportunity (Br. App. 36-39). Therefore, it does not appear that an
evidentiary hearing was required.
45

"take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it
reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234.
In this case, Judge Brian did not make his reasons for his decision a part of the
record. It also cannot be determined from the record whether Judge Brian considered the
required statutory factors in subsection 8(c). Therefore, this matter should be remanded for
Judge Brian to enter findings regarding the restitution order in light of the statutory' factors.
POINT V
JUDGE IWASAKI AND JUDGE RIGTRUP DID NOT ABUSE
THEIR DISCRETION IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES ON DEFENDANT FOR HIS ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION IN THREE AGGRAVATED ROBBERIES,
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HIS FLIGHT TO AVOID
PROSECUTION.
Defendant asserts that Judge Rigtrup impermissibly based his sentencing decision to
impose consecutive sentences on a death for which defendant had not been charged or
convicted (Br. App. 47-50). Defendant also argues that both Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup
abused their discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because "they failed to fully
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and defendant's history, character
and rehabilitative needs" (Br. App. at 44).
A- Judge Rigtrup did not base his imposition of a consecutive sentence on a death for
which defendant was not convicted.
Judge Rigtrup sentenced defendant to afive-year-to-lifeterm in prison for the Tool
Shed robbery to run consecutively from defendant's other sentences (R.R. 141,265). In
considering defendant's sentence, the court considered the seriousness of the crime, the
fact that defendant had pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery, defendant's
46

were not required to reward defendant'sflightfromjustice by giving him credit for his
conduct while a fugitive. To do so would have been a slap in the face to his co-defendants.
As Judge Rigtrup observed, "Your fugitive status, your failure to be here and face the
music has set you [apart]fromthe brother and cousin (R.R. 265)."16
In sum, under these facts, the consecutive sentences are not so inherently unfair that
they constitute an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments this Court should affirm the denial of defendant's
motions to suppress and the imposition of consecutive sentences. This Court should also
hold that Judge Brian could properly order defendant to reimburse him family for the
forfeiture of their collateral when defendant absconded. It should remand the restitution
issue, however, for Judge Brian to correct the clerical error in the final judgment
concerning the restitution order and for Judge Brian to enter findings regarding the
restitution order in light of the requisite statutory factors.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of June, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

6/LAURAB.DUAPIX
Assistant Attorney General
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Defendant cites to State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) and State v. Strunk.
846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993) to support his claim that his consecutive sentences are unfair.
Unlike defendant, however, Strunk was extremely young at the time of his crimes, which
was a basis for the Court's setting aside the consecutive sentences. IsL at 1301-02. Also,
unlike Smith, defendant's consecutive sentences do not amount to a minimum-mandatory
life sentence. Smith. 909 P.2d at 244-45.
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